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I. Choice vs Transaction 
“It is doubtful 1! there is yet general agreement among economists 
on the subject matter designated by the title 'theory of the firm', on, 
that 1s, the scope and purpose of the part of economics so !itled.”（Ar-
chibald 1987, p. 357) 
Archibald goes along with the understanding that there exists a 
general agreement on the subject matter of economics itself: the 
allocation and distribution of scarce resources Therefore, the purpose 
of the theory of the firm is to investigate the behavior of the firm as it 
affects allocation and distribution. 
Archibald’s defimtion of economics as the science which studies the 
allocation and distribution of scarce resources is somewhat neutral, but 
for those havmg a bit of background in the methodological studies, 1t is 
closely related or derived from the famous Robbins’ definition: 
“Economics is the science which studies human bahaviour as a 
re lat旧nshipbetween ends and scarce means which have alternahve 
uses”（Robbins 1935, p. 16) This makes economics the science of 
human choice, and immediately mv1tes the criticism of Ronald H 
Coase, which we are going to discuss m detail m the next section. 
Furthermore, 1f one 1denlif1es economic science as a science of 
choice, its natural corollary is to identify 1t as a set of approaches usmg 
maximization under constra旧tsIn this context, " a 'firm’is a profit 
maximizing agent . , endowed with a known and given technology, and 
operating subject to a well-def med market constraint”（Archibald, 
ibid., p. 357) 
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The analysis goes together with the theory of the consumer which is 
constructed under the assumption that consumers maximize utility, and 
brought into harmony by the theory of exchange matching demands 
and supplies so derived. 
Coase’s resp叩 seIS Immediate. “The elaboratrnn of the analysis 
should not hide from us its essential character: it is an analysis of 
choice It is this which gives the theory its versalllity. 'what most 
distinguishes economics as a discipline from other disciplmes in the 
social sciences is not its subJect matter but its approach' (Becker 1976, 
p. 5) . what has been developed is an approach divorced from subject 
matter.”（ Coase 1988, p 3) For Coase the results are horrible: "entities 
whose decisions economists are engaged in analyzmg have not been 
made the subJect of study and in consequence lack any substance. The 
consumer is not a human being but a consistent set of preferences. 
The firm . 'is effectively defmed as a cost curve and a demand 
curve, and the theory is simply the logic of opl!mal pricing and mput 
combmation' (Slater 1980, p. ix) Exchange takes place without any 
specification of Its institutional setting. We have consumers without 
humanity, firms without orgamzation, and even exchange without 
markets.”（Coase, Ibid., p 3) 
Since every theoretical model is a result of abstraction, criticisms 
placed on the neoclassical theories of the firm for their oversimplihca 
tions and/ or biases, on emphasizing the technological aspects of 
production and costs-the ’blackbox’type presentation are neither 
fair nor productive. 
As Kreps repeatedly states in his mteresting but complex textbook, 
we can learn something out of many simplihed, heunstic models if we 
locate them properly and pay attenl!on to their limitations(Kreps 1989). 
Furthermore, the techno aspects of the theories of the firm and 
industrial organizations are mterestmg as such(see, for example, Panzar 
1989, Baumol, et. al. 1988) 
The aim of this paper is to locate the various views given to the 
theories of the firm, and possibly to obtam some gains of division of 
labor or specialization or the economies of scope. We will concentrate 
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on the most fundamental problems, leaving treatments of more recent 
and advanced developments to the excellent surveys, such as 
Arrow (1959, 1974), Barney and Ouchi (1986), Clarke and McGuiness (19-
87), Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), Leibenstein (1987), Futterman (1986), 
and Williamson (1975, 1985, 1986). 
I. Why Firms Exist: Coase’s Crihc1sm 
“The firm in modern economic theory is an organization which 
transforms mput to output Why firms exist, what determines the 
number of firms, what determines what firms do are not questions 
of interest to most economists.”（ Coase, ibid., p. 5) 
Coase’s answer to this fundamental quest10n is, in his words, 'the 
cost of using the price mechanism：‘the cost of carrying out a 
transaction by means of an exchange on the open market，’ e marketmg 
costs', or‘the cost of market transactions’， later labled as“transaction 
costs”“In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to 
discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that 
one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leadmg 
up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection 
needed to make sure that the terms of contract are being observed, 
and so on.”（ Coase 1960, 1988, p. 6) 
In Dahlman’s terminology, these are the “search and information 
costs, bargammg and decision costs, policing and enforcement 
costs" (Dahlman 1979, p 148; "quoted m Coase, ibid., p. 6). 
Later, Williamson has summarized and expanded the view as 
follows (Williamson 1975, p. 8): (I) markets and firms are alternative 
instruments for completmg a related set of transactions, (2) whether a 
set of transactions ought to be executed across markets or within a firm 
depends on the relative efficiency of each mode, (3) the costs of writing 
and executmg complex contracts across a market vary with the 
characteristics of human decis10n makers ., and the objective 
properties of the market ., (4) although the human and environmental 
factors that impede exchanges between firms ( across a market ) 
manifest themselves somewhat dtfferently within the firm, the same 
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set of factors apply to both. 
Apparently (!) and (2) are the summaries of Coase’s origmal 
statements, (3) and (4) are Wt!hamson's new additional ms1ghts. For 
Williamson’s human characteristics, the most important elements are 
the bounded rationality and opportumsm, and for environmental 
characteristics, uncertainty/ complexity and small numbers (Barney and 
Ouchi 1986, p. 7 4). Each of them need separate treatments and 
elaborations, which we can not afford to do now. But it is easy to see 
there exist room for considerations of cultural roots and mshtut1onal 
mertia. We will simply pick one example related to the Japanese firms 
and economy later in this paper 
Aoki(! 984) summarized Coase’s reasons why the ’cost of using the 
pnce mechamsm’wt!l be lower when the firm IS mtroduced: (!)cost of 
discovenng what the relevant prices are (p. 390) and (2) cost that may 
be saved by making‘a long term’contract for the supply of some 
articles or services (p. 391). Of course, the most eminent in (2) 1s 
employment relations, owmg to asymmetry of nsk attitude between 
employees and employers 
Now, we have several answers to the questions of when the market 
wil fail and be replaced by some other hierarchical organizations like 
the firms: Williamson emphasizes the role of transaction specific 
investments and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) stress the team production 
or economies of scale and scope 
“Team production exists when 1t 1s not possible, by observing 
output, to 1dent1fy the individual productivities of mputs combming m 
the production process”（Clarke and McGuinness 1987, p JI) Natural 
extention of the argument 1s to give the residuals after paying the 
factors of production (other inputs) to those who hold the property 
rights and the right to 'monitor' the team member. Here the property 
rights include: (!)the nght to the residual productivity of the team 
beyond that which 1s necessary to keep the team operating, (2) the 
right to observe the productive input of individuals on the team, (3) the 
right to monitor al contracts with sources to input into the team, and 
(4) the right to sel these nghts (Barney and Ouchi, ibid., p 76). 
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Back to Coase agam, we see“in modern economic theory the market 
itself has an even more shadowy role than the firm”（ Coase, ibid., p. 
7). Markets are the institutions which minimize transaction costs. If 
transaction costs are assumed as zero, as in most of the microeconomic 
models, then markets have no function to perform. The co-existence of 
markets and zero transaction costs itself is a contradiction 
III Transact10n Cost Economics: W111iamson's Summary 
“Transaction cost economics adopts a contractual approach to the 
study of economic orgamzation”（Williamson 1989, p. 136) 
Characteristics of the transaction cost economics are: (!)more 
microanalytic, (2) more self-conscious about its behav旧ralassumptions, 
(3) introduces and develops the economic importance of asset 
spec山口ty,(4) relies on comparative institutional analysis, (5) regards the 
business firm as a governance structure rather than a production 
function, (6) places greater weight on the ex post mstitutions of 
contract, with special emphasis on private ordering, and (7) works out 
of a combmed law, economics and orgamzation perspective (Williamson, 
ibid., p. 136). 
Some of these characteristics are already familiar from the previous 
discussions begmnmg with Coase (1937) In addition, Williamson gives as 
a background for the developments in transaction cost economics, those 
contnbutions made m the 1930s (!)transaction should be made the 
basic unit of analysis (Commons), (2) study of contracts should focus 
less on legal rules・ private ordering or the efforts by the parties to align 
their own affalfs and devise mechanisms to resolve differences ( Llewe 
llyn), and (3) powers and limits of mternal organization should be 
brought more selfconsciously to the force(Barnard) (Williamson, ibid., 
p. 137). 
“Transaction cost economics pairs the assumption of bounded 
rationality with a self-interest-seeking assumption that makes allowance 
for gude.”（Williamson, ibid., p. 139) 
The not10n of the bounded rat10nality is, of course, taken from 
Herbert Simon. Simon enlarges the scope of rational economic analysis 
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and regards the economic actors as "intendedly rational, but only 
limitedly so”（Simon 1961). Economic models usually concentrate only 
on the rationality part, but organizational studies see that cognitive 
competence is limited“It is only because individual human beings are 
limited m knowledge, foresight, skil, and time that organizations are 
useful investments for the achievement of human purpose”（Simon 
1957: both quotatrons are from Wr!hamson, ibid., p. 139). 
About the self-interest-seeking assumption, transaction cost economics 
pays attention to the fact that economic agents are allowed to disclose 
information in a selective and distorted manner, as described m 
opportunism, moral hazard, and agency theories 
Bounded rat10nality and opportunism, in turn, help distmguishmg 
between feasible and infeasible modes of contracting: (1) Incomplete 
contracting: Although the assumption of a comprehensive ex ante 
contracting is a convenient one, the condit10n of bounded rationality 
precludes this. All feasible contracts are incomplete. Therefore, the ex 
post side of a contract is very important for a more realistic economic 
analysis. (2) Contract as a promise Another convenient assumption is 
that economic agents will reliably fulfil their promise. However, if 
economic agents are given to opportunism, this will never be realized. 
Ex post safeguards to detect opportunism should be set in order to 
prevent possible damages (Williamson, ibid., pp. 139 140). 
These understandings of human nature are complemented by the 
criticism of the assumption of well-def med property rights and that 
courts dispense Justice costlessly. As pomted out by Llewellyn, 
Williamson supports the stance to regard the “court as a framework ” 
“Participants to a contract can often devise more satisfactory solutions 
to their disputes than can professionals constrained to apply general 
rules on the basis of hmited knowledge of the dispute”（Galanter, M 
1981: quotation from Williamson, ibid, p 191). 
Compared with the standard solution given by the economists using 
market mechanism, transaction cost economics regard the 'transaction’ 
as the basic unit of analysis Concentrated attention is given to the 
economizing efforts to minimize the transaction costs by the orgamza-
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tion of transactions, in particular，“examination of the comparative 
costs of planning, adapting, and monitonng task completion under 
alternative governance structures" (Wilhamson, 1b1d., p 142). 
Principal dimensions with respect to which transactions differ are: (I) 
frequency, (2) degree and type of uncertainty, and (3) conditions of 
asset spec1f1口ty.Although the ftrst two are somewhat clear, the last 
one needs some explanation 
“Asset specificity has reference to the degree to which an asset can 
be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without 
sacrifice of productive value ”（Williamson, ibid., p 142). Five different 
kmds of asset specificity are considered (I) site specificity locations 
to economize on inventory and transportation costs, (2) physical asset 
spec1f1口ty specialized dies required, (3) human asset specificity -
human capital accumulation via learning by-domg processes, (4) 
dedicated assets-made at the behest of a particular customer, and (5) 
brand name capital (Wiiliamson, ibid., p. 143). 
Lastly, let us bnefly describe the difference in the treatments of the 
working of the transaction process by the transaction cost economics 
from the ordinary treatments in economics. “Transaction cost 
economics fully accepts . (the) description of ex ante bidding 
competition but insists that the study of contracting be extended to 
include ex post features A ful assessment requires that both 
contract execution and ex post competition at the contract renewal 
interval come under scrutiny”（Wilhamson, ibid, p. 144) Durable 
investments in transaction specific human and/ or physical assets will 
facilitate more economic handling of the transactions. 
IV. The Japanese Firm Aoki’s Three Principles本
Studies of Japan’s economy, particulary the studies directed to the 
nature, organization and operation of the Japanese firm, have now 
entered a third generation. A first generation of modern or modernistic 
* Eadier vernion of this section was published in author’s review of Aoki (1988) in 
Tokyo Business Today (July 1989), p. 62. 
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studies saw the Japanese firm and economy as somewhat under-
developed, and attempted to cnticrze, m an effort to “upgrade ”or 
modernize, usrng the economies of the advanced West as models. 
Japan’s emergence as a maJor economic power, mvrted a second 
generation of post modern studies, in which the Japanese way of doing 
things, including busmess organization and administrat旧n, was 
evaluated as“number one” 
But as the illusions spun in the high growth penod faded, new 
studies, based on theoretical and empirical advances, have emerged, 
producing a third generation of neo modern studies of the Japanese frrm 
and economy. Aoki's recent works are the masterpieces in this 
area (Aoki 1984, 1988, 1990). 
Neo-modernism resembles the first generation of modernist analysis 
m its use of more or less standard theoretical and empirical studies, 
however, is distinctive in adopting a pluralistic rather than a simple 
approach. For the modernist, there is nothing mystical about the 
Japanese firm and economy. It is successful because 江田“competitive”
according to the paradigm, burlt on postulates which maximize the 
behavior of economic agents mediated by market-clearing mechanisms. 
Therefore, as Aoki argues in descnbmg this style of analysis, any 
mternational imbalances may be corrected by realigning foreign 
exchange rates and appropnate mtemat旧nally coordmated pubhc 
policies affecting the maximizing behavior of economic agents (Aoki 
1988). 
In reaction, many culturalists, mostly in the post-modern group, have 
argued the Japanese firm and economy as a coherent and distinctive 
system burlt on various cultural traditions and emphasizmg values such 
as that of the small group and the reciprocal exchange of employee 
loyalty for employer paternahsm But, again, as Aoki points out, the 
implication (of such an argument) may be a dismal one. The current 
trade conflict may be impossible to resolve unless the Japanese change 
their erected cultural or protectionist walls (Aoki 1988). 
Aoki’s scholarship has been careful to avoid the sometimes simplistic 
arguments of both modernists and culturalists. In this, it has paved the 
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way for a more rat10nal approach to understandmg the Japanese firm 
and economy. 
Aoki begins with a reinterpretat10n of the labor market myth the 
view of a distinctive Japanese corporate structure based on life-time or 
long term employment, wage rate based on semonty, and the company 
union. Using information structure analysis, he amves at an mteresting 
pnnciple what he calls the First Duality Principle the Japanese firm 
is decentralized (horizontal) for information, but it is supported by a 
strongly centralized (non-market or vertical) personnel administration. 
In his more recent expression, the First Duality Principle is stated as 
"In order for firms to be internally mtegrative and organizat旧nally
effective, either their coordination or their incentive mode needs to be 
hierarchical, but not both. Japanese firms tend to be less hierarchical in 
coordination mode, while they rely upon rank hierarchies m their 
mcentive system”（Aoki 1990, pp. 13 14). 
The American-type firm, on the other hand, is centralized in terms 
of information but decentralized (subiect to markets) in personnel 
admimstration. More precisely, for the hierarchy (H) mode, 1t is 
ロecessaryto have (!)hierarchical separation between planning and 
implemental operation, and (2) emphasis on the economies of 
specialization meanwhile, in the Japanese (J) mode, we see (I) horizon 
tal coordination among operating units based on (2) the sharing of ex 
post on site informalton (learned results). Pnor planning sets only the 
indicative framework and as new information becomes available to 
operating units, prior plans wtll be modified. 
Note that the distinction 1s not simply a general reflection of cultural 
differences but stems from reasonable and explainable differences in 
the applicaton of on-the iob training in skil accumulated with the 
company over very long penods of time. Of course, they are subiect to 
comparative studies of advantages, particularly for cases of rapid or 
modest environmental changes 
A basic difference between the Japanese firm and the Amencan 
type firm is in the roles played by the worker (employees), owner 
(stockholders), and management The Japanese management plays the 
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role of a mediatmg agent which harmonizes the interests of the other 
two: 
(!) In the H-mode, operating tasks are separated from the coordi-
nating task and d1V1ded mto specific functions. 
(!)' In the J-mode, operatmg units are expected to be engaged in 
mutually coordmating their tasks as well Abilities to communicate and 
work together with peers are evaluated. 
(2) In order to fac1litate smooth adaptation of produc!ion scheduling, 
each operating unit changes quickly via knowledge sharing. 
(3) Job rotation among different offices are frequent and regular, 
both for white collar workers and blue collar workers. In order to make 
this possible, (i) designs of incen!ives (rewards) are not tightly related 
to specific job categories, and (i) personnel office for evaluations are 
developed. 
Aoki's restatement of the fmancial structure offers another conclusion 
which 1s of mterest: Japanese banks, especially“main banks ”， can be 
seen as monitoring agents. His Second Duality Principle the internal 
organization and financial control of the Japanese firm are dually 
characterized by weak-decision hierarchy and mcentive ranking 
hierarchy (Aoki 1990, p. 18). 
Applying his analysis to nalional industrial organization, including the 
workings of subcontractmg groups and their efforts at research and 
development, Aoki offers a third interesting conclus10n: social 
reputation, rather than monetary reward, acts as an incentive for top 
corporate managers, as well as actions of bureaucrats in the1r efforts at 
mediation m macroeconomic sphere Within the Japanese firm 
structure, we see his Third Duality Principle the corporate manage 
ment decis旧nsof the Japanese firm are sub1ect to the dual control 
(influence) of fmancial mterests (ownership) and employee’s interests 
rather than umlateral control in the mterests of ownership (Aoki 1990, 
p. 20). 
Summanzing the essential developments in the prmcipal agent 
theory, which is one of the mam lines of developments in the theories 
of the firm (!)hierarchical decomposition of control originating at 
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stockholders ( H mode), (2) market-conditioned incentive contracting, 
and (3) the control of the management decision accordmg to the value 
maximization criterion, Aoki emphasizes that hts three prmctples would 
give contrastmg alternatives. Are there some ways to join the 
commonalities and set converting trends into a more general model of 
the ftrm, or see some parallel developments preservmg the essential 
common features and differences, is an interesting open question. 
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「企業の理論」再訪
〈要約〉
木村憲二
その長い歴史にもかかわらず、「企業の理論」はいまだに安定した内容
を与えられていない。 1937年の論文以来のコースの批判点は、「企業の理
論」が「何故に企業が存在しなければならないのかj という根源的な聞を
回避して、ロピγズ流の経済学の「稀少性定義Jの延長として、合理的選
択理論の系である消費者行動理論と同ーの軌道をたどっている点にむけら
れている。コースの批判を継承したウィリアムソンの構想は、「選択」の科
学から「取引jの科学へという方向づけをもっており、後に「取引費用の
経済学」として結実した。「企業Jは「市場」と対比され、企業が存在する
のは、取引費用を極小化しようとする行動の結果である、というのがその
結論である。
青木昌彦氏による日本企業の分析は、この 般的な分析により具体的な
内容を与えている。本論はこのコース・ウィリアムソ y・青木のヲイ γに
よる「企業の理論」の再構築をあとづけてみようとするものである。
